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Abstract
In 1991, the rate of inflation in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland was between 35%
and 70%. At the end of 2001, it is below 8%. We setup a small structural macro model of
these economies to explain the process of disinflation. Contrary to a widespread skepticism,
which permeated a large part of previous research on these issues, we show that a simple open
macroeconomic model, along the lines of Svensson (2000, Journal of International
Economics), with forward-looking inflation and exchange rate expectations, can adequately
characterize the relationship between the output gap, inflation, the real interest rate and the
exchange rate during the course of transition.
We use the estimated models to interpret the main features of monetary policy in each country
and identify the channels of policy transmission. We characterize the policy rules and assess
the relative importance of the interest rate channel (on aggregate demand) and the exchange
rate channel (which affects both aggregate demand and supply) in determining the path of
(dis)inflation. In the same context, we also tentatively analyze the consequences of attempting
a faster path of disinflation. Finally, we evaluate the appropriateness of the inflation targeting
framework which has been adopted recently in all three countries, and discuss to what extent
it represents a discontinuity with the past.
JEL classification: E31, E52, F41, P24.
Keywords: Disinflation policy, Interest rate rules, Inflation targeting, Transition economies,
Small open-economy macro models.
21. Introduction
During the last decade, several economies in transition have achieved both monetary and real
stabilization. In many cases, this has been a remarkable story of success. In this paper we
study the process of disinflation in three countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
(CHP). Table 1 illustrates some essential aspects of the stabilization process.1 Partly in
retrospect and partly looking forward, it seems natural to pose three questions: (i) how did
monetary stabilization take place? (ii) could it have been faster or, instead, would a more
gradualist approach have reduced the costs of stabilization? (iii) once the process of
disinflation has been completed, how should the strategy of monetary policy be adjusted, in
particular to take into account the aspiration to EU and EMU membership?
  Table 1
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
(Annual averages) 1991 2000 1991 2000 1991 2000
Real GDP
growth
-11.6 +2.9 -11.9 +5.2 -7.0 +4.0
Unemployment
Rate
4.1 8.8 9.8 5.7 11.8 15.0
Inflation
(CPI)
56.6 3.9 35.0 9.8 70.3 10.1
Central Govt.
Surplus /Deficit
-2.0 -2.4 -4.6 -2.9 -3.8 -2.2
Curr. Units per euro
( ∆% 1999.10-2001.10)°
-6.8 -0.85 -14.8
° minus sign = appreciation of local currency
Source: Focus on Transition (2001) and National Central Banks.
On the face of it, the first question is the hardest to answer. Re-constructing and interpreting
the history of disinflation in those countries may seem an adventurous task. Reading the
official policy reports of some central banks during the past decade, one often encountered
                                                
1 Of course, macro data only tell the surface of the story. Underlying the macro framework, there is a
parallel and deeper story of structural changes, towards becoming "functioning market economies". In
this respect, the recent "Strategy paper on enlargement" of the EU
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/index.htm) includes CHP among the eight
"functioning market economies ... [which] should be able to cope with competitive pressure and
market forces within the Union in the near term".
3statements implying that: (i) monetary aggregates behaved unpredictably, (ii) the relation
between money and growth was unpredictable; (iii) price indexes were unreliable and
essentially responded to domestic cost pressures ... (iv) in addition to being heavily distorted
by changes in administrative prices; (v) changes in interest rates did not significantly affect in
a negative way domestic demand ... (vi) but might instead induce undesirable appreciations of
the exchange rate ... (vii) thus fuelling  into inflation (sic) either through the induced currency
inflows or  (viii) via wealth effects and aggregate demand pressures.  What might monetary
policy do in such circumstances? Our answer is that things were not necessarily as bleak as
they were described, and that throughout the years of transition monetary policy has been a
powerful and reliable tool for controlling aggregate demand. Thus, we build an “orthodox”
model2 of monetary policy, focusing in particular on the role of interest and exchange rates in
the transmission mechanism, from 19913 to 2000. We show that such a model adequately
characterizes the path of macro variables in CHP, and that the estimated equations are "well
behaved" and reasonably stable across time. By appropriately setting a moderately restrictive
path for nominal and hence for real interest rates and thus inducing a controlled appreciation
of the real exchange rates, monetary authorities have been able to gradually steer their
economies towards single-digit inflation, while containing the output costs of the stabilization.
On the basis of the estimated model, we are then also able to answer the two remaining
questions, on the choice of the speed of disinflation and how to adjust the policy strategy once
disinflation has been completed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the process of macroeconomic
stabilization in the three countries. Section 3 presents a small structural macro model of an
open economy, which is the starting point for the empirical part of the paper. The estimated
models for the three countries are presented in section 4, and out of sample simulations in
section 5. Section 6 concludes.
                                                
2 We use “orthodox” in reference to models were price-level determination embodies some degree of
stickiness and hence inflation is determined by the interplay of aggregate demand and supply, as in
the theoretical models proposed e.g. by Buiter (1980) and Svensson (1997; 2000), and the derived
empirical models of Rudebusch and Svensson  (1999), and  Favero and Rovelli (2002).
3 1993 for the Czech Republic.
42. Monetary strategy and stabilization policy in the three countries
2.1 Three roads, one ending
For the best part of the last decade, the three countries examined have been actively managing
their exchange rates, although in different ways.4
The Czech Republic (until the end of 1992, Czechoslovakia) introduced a currency peg in
1991, which it formally abandoned at the end of 1997, after a series of speculative attacks.
Currently, the exchange rate is in free float, although the euro is informally used as a reference
currency. In December 1997, the Czech National Bank (CNB) began to announce inflation
targets5. Throughout the period, the exchange rate vis-à-vis the DM has been almost constant
in nominal terms: it was 18.3 koruna to 1 DM in January 1991, and 17.0 in November 2001,
with a maximum revaluation at 16.9 in February 1997, and a minimum at 19.5 in December
1997 (monthly averages). The real effective exchange rate, accordingly, has been under
constant appreciation. In the CNB own calculations, it appreciated by 29.5% in CPI terms
between January 1993 and November 2001, and 13.9% in PPI terms. The explicit adoption of
inflation targets has not apparently had any impact on the behavior of the exchange rate (apart
from, possibly, helping to diffuse speculative pressures).
Hungary adopted a crawling band since March 1995, with the rate of depreciation being
gradually reduced as disinflation proceeded. The rate of crawl, initially at 1.9% per month,
was gradually reduced to 0.3% per month in April 2000, and finally to 0.2% in April 2001. At
almost the same time (May 2001) the fluctuation band was widened (±15%), rendering de
facto irrelevant the rate of crawl. Immediately after, following also the approval of a new
Bank Act (July 2001) the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) has begun to announce
quantitative targets for inflation.6
                                                
4 Recent surveys and interpretations of this period, with complementary perspectives, are Bofinger
and Wollmershaeuser (2000), Kutan and Brada (2000), Orlowski (2000),
5 Initially, the target was formulated with reference to "net inflation", calculated by the Czech
Statistical Office (CSO) as the growth of prices in the unregulated part of the consumer basket
adjusted for changes in indirect taxes and for abolition of subsidies. In April 2001, the target was
redefined as "headline inflation" (i.e. growth in the total consumer price index). Targets are set for
several years ahead, currently until 2005.
6 The first "Inflation Report" of the NBH was actually published in 1998.
5Also Poland, similarly to the Czech Republic, started off adopting a currency peg in 1990.
The commitment to fix the exchange rate did not last long, and in October 1991 Poland
moved to a crawling peg system. The pre-announced monthly rate of crawl was gradually
reduced, and then also transformed (May 1995) into a crawling band regime, with a wide
(±7%) band. The band was further widened in the next years (up to 15% in March 1999) and
finally abandoned, giving way to a free float, in April 2000. While pursuing its exchange rate
policy, the National Bank of Poland (NBP) nevertheless defined its official strategy in terms
of other variables: monetary targets until 1997; direct inflation targeting since October 1998.
Summing up, currently, the exchange rate regime of the three countries may be described as a
free float (although the ±15% band is still valid, though obviously not binding, for Hungary)
together with inflation targeting. This raises the question, to what extent the new policy
framework signals a discontinuity with the past? We turn to this issue in the next sub-section.
2.2 Inflation Targeting: is it a break from the past?
First, we must define what we mean by inflation targeting (IT). Recent literature has analyzed
in depth both the pre-requisites and the specific characterization of an IT policy strategy, also
in the context of emerging economies. Mishkin (2000) suggests that an IT strategy
encompasses five main elements: (i) announcement of targets, (ii) institutional commitment to
price stability, (iii) information-inclusive strategy (iv) transparency of strategy (v)
accountability of central bank for attaining the stated objectives. Amato and Gerlach (2001)
observe that these criteria, while they capture the spirit of IT, "are not very helpful in formally
defining this policy framework" and suggest that "IT is best thought of as a range of
strategies". This observation is correct, and we think that it should not be interpreted as a
criticism of Mishkin. The point is that almost all  "strategies" which are not formulated in
terms of a stringent rule7 should best be thought of as defining the policy framework chosen
by  the central bank with respect to other macro agents (the government, financial markets,
price and wage setters). For instance, as von Hagen (1999, p.699-700) succinctly states with
respect to the monetary-targeting strategy of the Bundesbank: "Money growth targeting served
the Bundesbank a number of politico-economic functions: It marked the end of the old regime
where the Bank was powerless to control monetary conditions in Germany; it defined the
                                                
7 We can think of only three examples of stringent rules: a k-percent rule of money growth; a
commitment to fix the exchange rate around a constant value, with a narrow band; the adoption of a
currency board. All other policy strategies, even if they can be formulated in terms of rules, always
6central bank's monetary policy goal and its role in the macro economic policy game; and it
served as a focal point in council meetings, strengthening the pursuit of a consistent monetary
policy geared at price stability over time". We suggest that IT strategies for emerging
countries, and for CHP in particular, have analogous politico-economic functions. In
particular, the adoption of an IT strategy by CHP may be interpreted as a clear signal that:
1. the central bank is committed to price stability
2. the goal of price stability is in close sight
3. the central bank is independent of the government and other actors on the
macroeconomic scene, who might in their turn be engaged in the pursuit of other
goals8
4. the financial position of the government is sustainable without recourse to
monetization9
5. the exchange rate policy is not (or not any longer) to be seen as the main anchor (or
intermediate target) of the disinflation policy - in particular, since the latter has been
almost completed, the pre-announcement of a rate of crawl no longer plays a central
role in the strategy for disinflation10, which in turn is a pre-requisite that ...
6. inflation forecasts have become the main intermediate target, the announcement of
which helps to anchor inflation expectations
7. the central bank will adopt an "all-inclusive" information stance, looking at the
determinants of inflation within a structured and broad analytical framework,
without placing specific emphasis on the role of monetary aggregates11
                                                                                                                                                        
involve a considerable discretion in the processing of upcoming information, and hence also with
respect to the timing of policy moves and the quantitative setting of policy instruments.
8   The independence of the three central banks is assessed in Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2001).
9  Hochreiter and Rovelli (2001) discuss this point in greater detail. After examining the relations
between government finances and monetary policy in CHP, they conclude:  "In all three countries,
seigniorage substantially declined in the observation period [1992-99]. It is now negligible in the
Czech Republic; around 1% of GDP in Hungary. Although it has increased to almost 4% of GDP in
Poland, this is a temporary effect due to the attempt to reduce inflation during 1998 by increasing the
level of domestic real rates of interest. Thus, in general, all our data indicate that monetary discipline
and independence have been strengthened during the period which we have examined."
10  For instance, in Hungary "the announcement of the rate of devaluation helped in developing the
forward-looking nature of expectations" (NBH, 1999a, p. 17) and "by periodically lowering the
devaluation rate the mechanism has been contributing successfully to the gradual reduction in the
inflation differential between Hungary and its trading partners..." (NBH, 1999b, p. 13). See also
Szapary and Jakab (1998).
11  An examination of the Inflation Report published by each central bank would give support to this
statement (as well as to points 1, 2, and 6 in the above list).
7We think that these seven "signals" convey the role and purpose of IT in most emerging
countries, and also with specific reference to CHP.12 However, for those signals to be
meaningful, some prerequisites must be satisfied. Amato and Gerlach (2001) list four such
preconditions: (i) central bank independence; (ii) sound fiscal policy; (iii) resiliency of the
economy to changes in interest and exchange rates; (iv) need for econometric models of the
inflation process and the transmission mechanism. They also point out, however, that these
preconditions "apply equally well to any other monetary policy framework" (id., p.5). This
observation should imply that, to the extent that monetary policy has been successful in
bringing about disinflation, the above prerequisites must have been satisfied also in the past,
at least to some extent. In fact, this seems to have been the case: as a proof by contradiction,
for instance, several authors have pointed out that temporary setbacks in the process of
stabilization have occurred at times when fiscal policy has behaved inconsistently, and central
bank independence has been side-stepped.13
But what about the econometric evidence on the inflation process and the transmission
mechanism? On the one hand, it is easy to point out that the size and sophistication of money
and financial markets, and the composition and quality of bank portfolios, have improved
considerably in the course of transition. Thus the channels of transmission must have evolved
somewhat. Also, the productive sector has been subject to considerable restructuring, so that
in principle one might expect to find some evidence of instability in the equations that reflect
the pricing-setting  behavior of producers or their sensitivity to the cost of capital. On the
other hand, it is also true that in each of the three countries the basic structure of money
markets was already in place at the beginning of the 1990s, and interest rates have been
liberalized towards the beginning of the decade. Hence, the extent to which the
macroeconomic features of the transmission mechanism have remained stable, in a broad
sense, throughout this period is largely an empirical question. In a previous paper on Hungary
(Golinelli and Rovelli, 2001), we conducted several tests of parameter stability, based upon a
small structural model, similar to the one presented in the next section. Our conclusion was
that most coefficients do not change significantly when estimated over different sub-samples
within 1991-99, and in particular that "the crucial parameters of the exchange-rate and interest
                                                
12 Kutan and Brada (2000) express a different opinion on this issue. However their paper examines
data and facts only up to the first half of 1999, hence it is possible that some of their reservations
would not apply any longer today.
13 For instance, see Begg (1998) for the fiscal policy reasons behind the Czech crisis of 1997.
8rate equations are clearly stable across the two sub-samples".14 In the rest of the paper, we
shall propose and evaluate three parallel small macro models of the transmission mechanism,
which will allow us to evaluate the main aspects of the transmission mechanism in CHP. This
will help us to fulfil three tasks:
• to characterize the process of disinflation which has taken place in the last decade
• to understand to what extent the adoption of IT represents a discontinuity with the
previous strategies of monetary policy
• to assess whether all the preconditions for a successful strategy of IT are in place in CHP.
3. Model specification
Our approach to modeling the transmission mechanism of monetary policy may be
synthesized as follows. By controlling the evolution of nominal interest rates (for given
foreign rates, and taking into account the required risk premium) the central bank also
influences the path of the nominal exchange rate and may induce a pressure towards a desired
degree of real appreciation.15 Both directly (via the chosen level of the real interest rate) and
indirectly (through the induced real exchange-rate appreciation), the central bank may thus
influence the evolution of aggregate demand and of the inflation rate. As a result, taking into
account the lag structure with which these effects take place in practice, a policy of persistent
high real interest rates will lead to a process of gradual disinflation. This view of the
transmission mechanism places domestic interest rates at the center of the analysis, and is
compatible in principle with different strategies concerning the exchange rate policy. This
raises the question of how to describe the policy rule(s) for setting interest rates, which the
monetary authorities have followed in each country during the last decade. In particular we
suggest that the choice of one or the other policy (or regime) with respect to the exchange rate,
                                                
14 In less structured modeling frameworks, Siklos and Abel (2001) for Hungary and Christoffersen,
Sloek and Wescott (2001) for Poland provide evidence in favor of a significant relation between
inflation and monetary instruments. Also, Orlowski (2001) provides some preliminary evidence on the
effectiveness of the adoption of IT strategies in changing the dynamics of the inflation process in the
Czech Republic and Poland.
15 Normally, one would expect that the rate of real appreciation is maximum under policies that peg
the nominal exchange rate, and null under policies that result in a nominal depreciation equal to the
inflation differential.  Occasionally, both boundaries may be overshot. This happens either because
(despite the inflation differential) the nominal exchange rate appreciates under speculative pressures,
or when it depreciates faster than inflation, as during a currency run. See also the discussion in
Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser (2000).
9will influence the relative importance of different channels of transmission, but will not alter
in a fundamental way the structure of the underlying macroeconomic relations.16
According to this view, we follow the modeling strategy suggested by Svensson (2000) for a
small open economy. Our model includes four structural equations:
• aggregate supply, normalized in the rate of inflation (AS)
• aggregate demand, normalized in the output gap (AD)
• uncovered interest parity, augmented by a risk premium, normalized in the current
exchange rate (ER)17
• a policy rule  for setting the domestic interest rate (IR).
External shocks to the model originate for foreign prices, foreign demand and foreign interest
rates. Equations AS, AD, and IR are specified with general lag structures. All four equations
are affected by different white noise shocks  εj (j = 1, 2, 3, 4). In the estimation, lags have been
selected by imposing data admissible restrictions (see section 4).
In the AS equation (1), domestic inflation (∆p) is driven by the long-run purchasing power
parity condition [e + p* − p], where e  is the log-level of the nominal exchange rate,  p*  and  p
are the foreign and the domestic log-levels of prices. In the short-run, domestic inflation is
also affected by the output gap (y) and the foreign inflation rate:
∆pt = α0  +  α1(L) ∆pt-1  +  α2(L) ∆p*t  +  α3(L) yt-1  +
α4(L) [et-1 + p*t-1 − pt-1]  +  ε1t (1)
                                                
16 This point is well expressed also in a recent quotation from the NBH, which also stands in sharp
contrast to the skepticism which emanated from many previous statements from the same source:
“The objective of monetary policy is to achieve and maintain price stability. The central bank’s
primary instrument in attaining this goal is to change its benchmark rates. In this way, the Bank
can influence inflation partly through the exchange rate’s direct disciplinary power over price
increases and partly through the effect of the real exchange rate and real interest rates on
aggregate demand. In small countries such as Hungary, the exchange rate channel is the central
bank’s most powerful and fastest means of influencing domestic prices. Therefore, the
exchange rate will retain its prominent role even though the Bank has much smaller power over
the path of the exchange rate than under the previous narrow-band regime. In the future, if the
National Bank wishes to influence the exchange rate in support of the inflation target, it will do
so primarily by changing interest rates”. (National Bank of Hungary, Quarterly Report on
Inflation, August 2001, pp.35-36).
17 Strictly speaking, this specification may apply also to the case of an exchange rate peg with a given
fluctuation band.
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In the AD equation (2), the output gap is linked to the expected real interest rate [i – E ∆p],
the real exchange rate, the growth of world demand (∆w), and a measure of the fiscal impulse
(bg):
yt = β0  +  β1(L) yt-1  +  β2(L) [it-1 – Et-1 ∆pt]  +
β3(L) [et-1 + p*t-1 − pt-1]  +  β4(L) ∆wt  +  β5(L) bg t-1 + ε2 t (2)
The ER equation (3) is based on the UIP hypothesis, augmented with a stationary risk
premium, ϕt, modeled as an AR1 process:
et = Et et+1  −  (it − i*t)  +  ϕt ,   were:  ϕt  = γ0 + γ ϕt-1  +  ε3 t (3)
The IR equation (4) defines the nominal interest rate differential (i – i*) in terms of a forward-
looking dynamic18 Taylor rule ; ε4 are random shocks to the interest rate differential.
it − i*t = δ0 + δ1(L) (it-1 − i*t-1)  +
δ2 Et (∆pt+1 − ∆p*t+1)  +  δ3 Et yt+1  +  ε4t (4)
All equations are jointly estimated and simulated with model-consistent expectations. If the
variables in each equation are stationary or cointegrated, then we may obtain statistical
estimates of the steady state solution of the model, conditional on the steady state values of
the foreign variables.
In the out-of-sample simulations, we study the path to nominal convergence. To ensure
convergence, we impose the following long-run restrictions of the rate of domestic inflation,
on the nominal exchange and interest rates and on the risk premium:
∆p = ∆p* ∆e = 0 i  =  i* γ0 = δ0 = 0
Notice that this also implies a long run condition on the constancy of the real exchange rate.19
4. Estimation method and results
The data set for each country includes seven variables, measured quarterly from 1991.1 to
2001.1 (1993.1 to 2001.1 for the Czech Republic). All variables except interest rates and the
                                                
18 Goodfriend (1987) and Walsh (1998, ch.10) rationalize the inclusion of autoregressive parameters
in interest rate rules with reference to the authorities' desire to smooth the path of interest rates.
19 In addition, we shall also need to specify a terminal condition on the value of the exchange rate, in
order to be able to solve forward the ER equation. More on this in the next section.
11
ratio of capacity utilization are in logs. We use the CPI for domestic prices, p; and the
capacity utilization ratio to measure the output gap, y.20 Inflation (∆pt , ∆p*t) and exchange
rate changes are measured as annualized quarterly changes; for output we use quarterly
changes. The domestic interest rate, i, is the three-month Treasury Bill rate. The nominal
exchange rate, e, is the weighted average of the exchange rate of each country against the DM
(or ECU) and the USD, with variable weights chosen according to the objectives or targets
indicated by each national central bank. Foreign prices, p*, are the weighted average of the
German and US CPI, with weights chosen according to the same criterion as for exchange
rates; similarly, the foreign interest rate, i*, is the weighted average of German and US short-
term rates (respectively, the call money rate for Germany and the rate on 3-mos. CD for the
US). World demand, w, is proxied by the index of world trade in manufactures. Data sources
and more detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix 1.21
The model is estimated by three stages least squares (3SLS).22 Hsiao (1997) shows that the
structural equation approach for estimation and testing is still valid, even when some
regressors are non stationary, provided they are cointegrated23. In Appendix 2 we show that
these requirements are satisfied for all the non-stationary variables in the set of regressors.
The estimated equations track the data quite well, and their statistical performance is
satisfying, despite the short sample of observations. At a general level, a strong check on the
validity of the model is the fact that very similar specifications emerge independently for the
three countries in our data set. In the Appendix 3 we report results of the mis-specification and
stability tests, and plots of the estimated equations.
                                                
20 The time series properties of capacity utilization are quite similar to those of an HP filter on GDP.
In particular, the two variables indicate a very similar evolution of the business cycle. These
comparisons are available on request from the authors.
21 Notice that ∆ indicates the difference between two consecutive quarters and ∆4 indicates the
difference between the same quarter in two consecutive years. In all cases, inflation rates are defined
on an annual scale, i.e. ∆pt-k+1 ≡ 4 (pt-k+1 - pt-k ). Et-k  measures expectations formed at time t-k.
22 The alternative GMM estimator brings efficiency gains in presence of heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation but asymptotically it becomes equivalent to 3SLS if the disturbances are white noise
(see the diagnostic tests on the residuals, in Appendix 3). In addition, if the disturbances are also
normally distributed, 3SLS has the same asymptotic distribution as the (asymptotically efficient) full
information maximum likelihood estimator. Finally, GMM methods are more data demanding than
3SLS; in our case they are often infeasible because of small samples.
23 Hsiao (1997, p. 395) concludes that “in a structural approach one still needs to worry about the
issues of identification and simultaneity bias, but one need not worry about the issues of non-
stationarity and cointegration.”
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For ease of comparison across countries, we discuss the results of estimation for each equation
in turn. In Table 2 we show the estimates of the aggregate supply equation. For each country,
the pressure on domestic inflation from aggregate demand and the real exchange rate are well
identified.
A homogeneity condition has been imposed in each equation, to ensure that domestic inflation
converges to the foreign rate in the long run. This restriction is easily not rejected for the
Czech R. (χ2 = 0.431, P-value = 0.512), and Hungary (χ2 = 0.579, P-value = 0.447). For
Poland, the restriction is rejected at 5% but not rejected at 1% (χ2 = 5.04, P-value = 0.025).
For the Czech R. we may also identify the level of long-run capacity utilization at which
inflation converges to the foreign rate. For the other two countries, the condition for nominal
convergence is simply ∆pt - ∆p*t = ∆yt = 0, which may be satisfied at any constant rate of
capacity utilization.
Similarly, note that for the Czech R. and Hungary, the level of the real exchange rate affects
domestic inflation. For Poland, we find a direct link between inflation and changes in the
nominal exchange rate. This implies that, in the long run solution for the Czech R. and
Hungary, the inflation differential attains zero when the real exchange rate attains its long run
equilibrium value, whereas for Poland the convergence condition is simply ∆pt - ∆p*t = ∆et =
0, which may be verified at any level of the real exchange rate.
We observe that the effect of the real exchange rate appreciation is much more direct (with an
impact coefficient of 0.695 on inflation) in the case of the Czech Republic, which corresponds
well to the fact that the CNB consistently placed a greater emphasis, relative to the other two
central banks, on the role of real exchange rate appreciations as a means to disinflation.
In the AD equations (Table 3), we notice that shocks have a high persistence: the sum of the
autoregressive coefficients of the lagged dependent variables is in each case around 0.85. The
effects of the real interest rate and of changes in the real exchange rate and in world demand
are in each case well identified and significant. However, real interest rates affect AD in the
Czech Republic only with a very long lag (first impact is after 5 quarters) whereas the
competitiveness effect takes place with a shorter lag (3 quarters, same as in the other two
countries) and is much stronger than in the other countries. Again, this corresponds well to the
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different exchange rate strategy adopted by the CNB. Finally, in the case of the Czech
Republic we also found a small, significant effect of the government budget variable on AD.24
Notice that, on the basis of the estimated AD equations, we may also compute the level of
capacity utilization, which prevails in the long run, as a function of the real interest rate and of
the rate of growth of world demand. This will be required for the simulations of the model.
In Table 4 the current exchange rate is shown to depend on the current interest rate differential
and on the expected future exchange rate, augmented by a risk premium. The AR1 coefficient
on the risk premium varies between 0.45 in Hungary and 0.75 in the Czech Republic. Note
that there is no constant component in the risk-premium for the Czech Republic. This may
plausibly be linked to the fact that for a large part of the sample the CNB was successfully
targeting the nominal exchange rate.25
In the estimation, we imposed the restriction  γ0/(1-γ) = δ0/[1-δ1(1)] between equations (3) and
(4). This implies equality in the long run between the risk premia in the UIP and interest rate
equations. The restrictions are never rejected.26
                                                
24 bg measures the government balance (a positive value equal surplus) on GDP. Comparable data are
not available on a quarterly basis for the other countries.
25 For this reason, we also estimated an alternative version of the model, setting the exchange rate as
an exogenous variable. Estimates of all the parameters in the other three equations are virtually
identical. Results are available on request. Notice however that exchange rate targeting by the CNB
has been suspended at the end of 1997.
26 For the Czech Republic: χ2 = 2.087 (p-value = 0.149). The additional restriction of both coefficient
being equal to zero is also not rejected: χ2 = 4.62, p-value = 0.099. For Hungary: χ2 = 0.033 (p-value =
0.855). For Poland: χ2 = 1.706 (p-value = 0.191). For Hungary and Poland we reject the zero
coefficient restrictions; hence, in these cases we have a constant component of the risk premium,
which is between 0.5% and 0.9% per quarter. These results are embodied in the estimates in Table 5.
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Table 2. Aggregate supply (Equation 1)
Czech R. ∆pt = -1.227   +   ∆p*t + 0.657 yt-1 + 0.997 yt-3 + 0.695 (et-1 + p*t-1 − pt-1)
(0.318)   (0.339)    (0.317)   (0.112)
Hungary ∆pt = 0.055 + 0.872 ∆pt-1 – 0.596 ∆pt-4 + 0.392 ∆pt-5 + 0.332 ∆p*t-2 + 0.600 (yt-1 - yt-3) + 0.277 (et-1 + p*t-1 − pt-1)
(0.021) (0.091)      (0.131)         (0.113)      (-)       (0.18)        (0.104)
Poland ∆pt = 0.650 ∆pt-1 + 0.199 ∆pt-4 – 0.067 ∆pt-5 + 0.217 ∆p*t-1 + 0.457 (∆yt-1-∆yt-3 ) +   0.168 (∆et-1  + ∆et-3 )/2 
      (0.042)   (0.011)     (0.013) (-)   (0.158) (0.040)
Table 3. Aggregate demand (Equation 2)
Czech R. yt =  0.073 + 0.536 yt-1 + 0.339 yt-3 – 0.122 [(it-5 – Et-5 ∆pt-4)+(it-6 – Et-6 ∆pt-5)]/2  +
     (0.061) (0.091)       (0.086)       (0.040)
      0.211 ∆(et-3 + p*t-3 − pt-3) + 0.223 ∆wt + 0.238 ∆wt-4 – 0.163 bgt-2
       (0.081) (0.045)  (0.050)      (0.110)
Hungary yt =  0.082 + 0.516 yt-1 + 0.369 yt-2 – 0.122 [it-1 – Et-1 ∆4pt] + 0.115 ∆4(et-1 + p*t-1 − pt-1) + 0.205 ∆4wt-1
   (0.036)  (0.137)      (0.128)        (0.052)         (0.046)      (0.068)
Poland yt =  0.099 + 0.843 yt-1 – 0.047 (it-1–Et-1 ∆pt) + 0.025 ∆(et-3+p*t-3−pt-3) + 0.133 ∆wt-2
     (0.034)  (0.053)      (0.020)     (0.009)      (0.041)
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Table 4. Exchange rate (Equation 3)
Czech R. et = Et et+1 − [it − i*t]/4 + ϕt , where: ϕt  =  0.751 ϕt-1 
              (0.179)
Hungary et = Et et+1 − [it − i*t]/4 + ϕt , where ϕt  = 0.0091 + 0.445 ϕt-1 
  (-)    (0.152)
Poland et = Et et+1 − [it − i*t]/4 + ϕt , where: ϕt  = 0.0054 + 0.660 ϕt-1 
     (-)    (0.139)
Table 5. Interest rates  (Equation 4)
Czech R. ∆(it − i*t) = -0.188 [it-1 − i*t-1] + 0.208 Et [∆pt+1 − ∆p*t+1]
       (0.065)      (0.079)
Hungary ∆(it − i*t) = -0.318 [it-1 − i*t-1 − 0.065] + 0.528 ∆[it-1 − i*t-1] + 0.335 ∆[it-3 − i*t-3] + 0.228 Et (∆pt+1 − ∆p*t+1)
    (0.066)    (0.016)    (0.116)   (0.125) (0.065)
Poland ∆(it − i*t) = -0.303 [it-1 − i*t-1 − 0.063] + 0.309 ∆[it-1 − i*t-1] − 0.006 ∆[it-3 − i*t-3] +0.213 [∆pt − ∆p*t] − 0.224 ∆[∆pt-2 − ∆p*t-2]
    (0.033)    (0.014)    (0.047)   (0.001)          (0.041)             (0.028)
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In Table 5 the differential between domestic and foreign interest rates is shown to depend on
an autoregressive component and on the expected inflation differential. For Poland, in
particular, we found an equilibrium error-correction model, with the target interest rate
differential linked to the expected future inflation differential, on the basis of the following
relation:    it − i*t = 0.065 + 0.7 Et (∆pt+1 − ∆p*t+1).
In contrast to interest rate rules estimated for advanced industrial countries, we found that the
rate of domestic capacity utilization does not help to explain the interest rate differential in
any one of the three countries.27
As regards the measurement of the anti-inflationary stance, we notice that there are in general
two possibilities for a non-accommodating policy. A traditional Taylor rule requires that
interest rates react to inflation expectations with a coefficient higher than unity (at least in the
long run). However, this does not apply to the case where a persistent policy of disinflation is
required. For instance, if interest rates are set initially at a high enough level, relative to the
rate of inflation, then the less they react to changes in the rate of inflation, the more
aggressive the policy stance becomes. This observation clearly applies to all the three
countries, as the estimates in Table 5 show.28
Detailed diagnostic tests for all equations, including tests of parameter constancy, are
presented in Appendix 3. Here we briefly present (Table 6) only on the results of the stability
tests.29 The tests are reported for each equation and also for the full model. In general,
evidence of instability is limited to the initial years in the sample. For the Czech Republic,
                                                
27 The fact that interest rates do not respond to the rate of capacity utilization (in reference to equation
4, δ3 = 0) does not imply that central banks neglect the real costs of stabilization policy. Concern for
these costs is embodied in the choice of the speed of disinflation. That capacity utilization is not
significant in the interest rate setting equations only implies that this policy is unchanged across the
business cycle.
28For Hungary and Poland, this point may easily be seen in reference to the estimated constant
component of the risk premium. If we arbitrarily constrain this parameter to zero in the estimation of
equations 3 and 4, then the resulting estimates of the (long-run) effect of expected inflation on interest
rates becomes greater than unity (not reported, available on request). Although as we mention in the
text this restriction is formally rejected, its imposition would not appreciably change the remaining
parameter estimates.
29 Tests have been conducted adding to each equation one dummy variable for each quarter tested for
stability. Testing for predictive failure is then equivalent to testing for the joint significance of zero-
restrictions on the coefficients of the dummy variables. In this way we can test for predictive failure
both in the first and last part of the sample. We present the p-values of the F-version  of the chi-square
Wald test, as the F statistic is expected to have better small sample properties than the (asymptotic)
chi-square statistic. Notice that in any case the results of these tests have to be interpreted with
caution, as Candelon and Lutkepohl (2001) show that, in the context of multiple time series systems,
Chow-type tests have distorted size (i.e. they reject far too often the null hypothesis of stability).
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instability originates from eqs. 1 (AS) and 4 (interest rate rule). For Hungary, from eqs. 2
(AD) and 4. For Poland, from eq 1. Only for Poland there is some evidence of instability also
at the end of the sample, in particular for the year 1999, in eqs. 2 (AS) and 3 (ER).
Table 6. Stability Tests
Country Period eq. 1 eq. 2 eq. 3 eq. 4 System
1993 0.0061 0.7548 0.9777 0.0080 0.0243Czech
Republic 2000 0.9920 0.6872 0.7635 0.9892 0.9845
1991 0.3696 0.0024 0.0147 0.5503 0.0074
1991-1992 0.3859 0.0002 0.1003 0.0370 0.0039
1999-2000 0.9101 0.6205 0.9875 0.7247 0.9581
Hungary
2000 0.9431 0.9374 0.8462 0.4980 0.9646
1991 0.4642 0.5642 0.1834 0.0757 0.1848
1991-1992 0.0108 0.7566 0.2801 0.2006 0.0756
1999-2000 0.7383 0.0030 0.0470 0.9728 0.0652
Poland
2000 0.9597 0.6085 0.1696 0.9142 0.7976
Notes. Reported values are P-values of the F version of the second Chow test, for the
relevant period. Test for year 2000 include five quarters, up to 2001.1.
See Tables A.6.1, A.6.2, A.6.3 for other details.
Overall, while it is not surprising that we should find instability in the first years of the
transition process it is instead quite comforting30 to find that the estimated equations are in
general remarkably stable in the most recent years.
                                                
30 Also keeping in mind the results of Candelon and Lutkepohl (2001), mentioned in the  previous
footnote.
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5. Simulation results
In order to examine the long run implications of the estimated models, we have simulated
them outside the sample of estimation. Any solution to the model must take into account the
forward-looking nature of the exchange rate in equations (3). This requires in each case the
choice of an appropriate terminal condition. We have assumed that the real exchange rate
converges, at the end of the solution period, to the long run value, computed on the basis of
the reduced form, steady state solution. This allows us to find a consistent expectations
solution to the model. In particular, the steady state solution is formulated in terms of the level
of the real exchange rate for the Czech Republic and Hungary. For Poland instead the terminal
condition only imposes that the real exchange rate becomes constant31. For the three countries,
in addition, convergence of the iterative procedure is ensured by the existence of a steady state
solution for the inflation rate, capacity utilization and domestic interest rates.
To simulate the model outside the period of estimation, we also need to forecast the three
exogenous (foreign) variables. To this purpose, we assumed the following long run values:
∆p* = 0.024 ; ∆w = 0.072 ;  i* = 0.043.32
Finally, for Hungary and Poland we also need to forecast the evolution of the constant
component of the risk premium, γ0 , outside the estimation sample. In the simulations reported
below, we assumed a decay parameter equal to 0.6.33
We simulated the model from 2001.2 to 2020.4. 34 In Fig. 1.1 we plot the point forecasts from
a deterministic simulations for the Czech Republic, in Fig.1.2 for Hungary and Fig. 1.3 for
Poland. In each case we also add a forecasting interval (± one forecasting error).35
                                                
31 The level is estimated at –0.213 for the Czech Republic, and –0.200 for Hungary. Note that in
Golinelli and Rovelli (2001) the corresponding estimate for Hungary was –4.635, but this was due to
a different normalization of the equation. The effective difference between the two terminal
conditions for Hungary is about 7%. For Poland, the value at which the real exchange rate becomes
constant is –0.340.
32 This is the same as in Golinelli and Rovelli (2001). In addition, for the Czech model, we set the
fiscal impulse, bg ,equal to zero in the long run.
33   We did two checks on this assumption. First we assumed a decay parameter of γ0 equal to 0.8.
Second, we re-estimated the model imposing from the outset the restriction γ0 = 0, and simulated the
model on the basis of the new estimated parameters. In both cased the simulated path of the
endogenous variables was very insignificantly different from the first simulations (results available on
request).
34 We performed the simulations with a Fair and Taylor (1983) scheme, without the automatic
extension of the time horizon, using Eviews 4. The simulation results are unaffected when moving the
end point of the simulation either to 2015 or forward.
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Fig. 1.1 – History (shaded) and forecast, the Czech Republic
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The three sets of the simulations attract similar comments. In general, we accept that our
models do not yield particular insights on the evolution of output or of the real exchange rates
in the long run. As we explained in Section 3, the steady state values of these variables are
computed from the estimated parameters of the equations for aggregate demand (eq.1) and
from the cointegrating vector for the real exchange rate (Tables A.5.1, -2, -3 in Appendix 2).
This implies that we do not take into account the evolution of potential output over time, nor
the effects of productivity on the real exchange rate. These limitations cannot be avoided in
the context of our model.
We now move on to more specific comments. As regards the continuation of disinflation, for
the Czech Republic, as the process has been almost completed, there is not much to be said,
                                                                                                                                                        
35 Intervals have been obtained performing a stochastic simulation of the model (1000 repetitions).
The unknown equation errors were measured by pseudo-random values, extracted from a distribution
with a covariance matrix from the estimated equations.
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except that there might still be a few bumps at the end of the story. For Hungary and Poland
the graphs obviously point out that disinflation is slightly slower, but the point forecast
indicate that inflation should reach 4% by 2003-04 in each country, although the interval of
the forecasts is wider for Poland.
We were instead surprised, in a negative way, that the path of nominal interest rates is in each
case so imprecisely defined. For instance, the entire range of values between 0 and 9% is
encompassed in the forecasting interval for the Czech Republic. Similar or slightly wider
intervals apply to the other countries. As the interest rate rules were estimated with sufficient
precision (Tables A.6.1, -2, -3 in Appendix 3), this behavior must probably be attributed to the
high persistence of the autoregressive risk premium (See Table 4).
Fig. 1.2 – History (shaded) and forecast, Hungary
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Fig. 1.3 – History (shaded) and forecast, Poland
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5.1 A more aggressive policy stance
How would the path of the endogenous variables changed if the three central banks had
conducted a more aggressive policy against inflation since 1993? To answer this question, we
have compared the baseline simulation of the model from 1993 to 2020, with an alternative,
where the response of nominal interest rates to the expected inflation differential has been
increased relative to the estimated value. In particular, we set the long run elasticity of the
nominal interest rate differential to the inflation differential to approximately 1.6 for all three
countries.36 The effects of this more aggressive policy stance on the variables of the model are
plotted in Figures 2.1-2.337.
                                                
36 In particular, we multiplied by 1.5 the impact parameter in the equation 4 for the Czech Republic
and Hungary (which imply long-run effects respectively equal to 1.662 and 1.624), and by 1.8 the
parameter for Poland (1.627 in the long-run).
37 The right columns plots report the differences between the simulated baseline policy and the
simulated more aggressive policy. Interval estimates of one standard error where obtained by running
1000 stochastic simulations.
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Since the estimated model for Poland does not yield a direct solution for the level of the long-
run real exchange rate, and the terminal condition is simply set at that level where the real
exchange rate becomes constant, one consequence of simulating an alternative policy for
Poland is that the terminal value of the real exchange rate will be changed accordingly. For
this reason, the large increase in the “proactiveness” of the NBP towards the inflation
differential implies a real appreciation of the exchange rate with respect to the baseline
solution.38
Briefly, the other main results of these simulations are the following. For each country, we
find that a more aggressive stance would deliver a benefit in terms of faster disinflation. For
the Czech Republic, inflation would have been about 4% lower in 1995-96, but the
subsequent resurgence of inflation in 1997 would not have been avoided. Thus, the induced
lower levels of output (-1% for about five years) would appear as a net cost, with no
permanent gain.
For Hungary, the gains on the inflation front are more pronounced and permanent (as inflation
drops by about 12% in 1994-96), but the output costs are also large (-4% in 1994-95, and then
gradually fading away, but not disappearing until 2001). Interestingly, most of the effects
would seem to come through the appreciation of the real exchange rate, which approaches
much faster its steady-state value39.
For Poland, the behavior of inflation is similar to that of Hungary, but the costs to output are
more short-lived, since in any case the economy ends up in the recession of 1998-99, which is
almost identical in either policy scenario. In the more aggressive scenario, the path of nominal
interest rates would have been almost unchanged (apart from the obvious initial increase in
1993-94). The real exchange rate would end up permanently more appreciated by about 1.5%.
Overall, these simulations point out that faster disinflation would have been possible, but that
in each case it would have imposed additional output costs. We must stress that these results
are the outcome of somewhat mechanical counterfactual simulations, which certainly are not
immune to the Lucas’ (1976) critique, and thus must be interpreted with caution. In particular,
it is quite possible that some of the estimated parameters are not deep, i.e. they might not be
                                                
38 For Hungary and Poland, in these alternative simulations we used parameters estimated subject to
the restriction that the constant risk premium is zero (See the discussion of this point in footnote 28).
This is consistent with the fact that an increased proactiveness of the central bank would most likely
increase credibility and hence result in reduced risk premia. Moreover, this avoids the need to set an
arbitrary path of decay for the exogenous component of the risk premium.
39 This effect is similar to that obtained in Golinelli and Rovelli (2001).
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independent of the policy rule, which the monetary authority is expected to follow. For
instance, it is possible that, if the central bank credibly announces a more resolute path of
disinflation, the degree of persistence of inflation (the α1(L) polynomial in eq.1) and of the risk
premium (the autoregressive parameter, γ, in eq. 4) might have been lower. If this were the
case, then it is also possible (but by no means unambiguously necessary) that the results of the
simulations indicate an upper bound for the output loss resulting from a faster disinflation.
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Fig. 2.1 – Simulation of a more aggressive policy stance, Czech Republic.
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Fig.2.2 – Simulation of a more aggressive policy stance, Hungary
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Fig. 2.3 – Simulation of a more aggressive policy stance, Poland
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6. Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that a simple open macroeconomic model, with forward-looking
inflation and exchange rate expectations, can adequately characterize the relationships
between the output gap, inflation, the real interest rate and the exchange rate during the course
of transition. These findings go against a widespread skepticism, which permeated a large part
of previous research on these issues.
We have specified and estimated three small, similar models for the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland, for the period 1991-2000. In our view of the transmission mechanism, domestic
interest rates are at the center of the analysis, and their role is compatible in principle with
different strategies concerning the exchange rate policy. Accordingly, we have characterized
empirically the policy rules prevailing in each country, and assessed the relative importance of
the interest rate channel (on aggregate demand) and the exchange rate channel (which affects
both aggregate demand and supply) in determining the path of (dis)inflation. From this point
of view, it is interesting to observe that the effect of the real exchange rate on the evolution of
inflation is much more direct in the case of the Czech Republic, relative to the other countries.
This corresponds well to the fact that the CNB consistently placed a greater emphasis, relative
to the other two central banks, on the role of real exchange appreciations as a means to
disinflation. Similarly, although the effects of the real interest rate and of changes in the real
exchange rate on aggregate demand are in each case well identified and significant, we also
found that in the Czech Republic real interest rates affect demand only with a very long lag,
whereas the competitiveness effect takes place with a shorter lag and is much stronger than in
the other countries: again, this corresponds well to the different exchange rate strategy
adopted by the CNB.
Apart from these quantitative differences, the models are broadly similar from the qualitative
point of view. This provides an important crosscheck on the validity of our modeling
framework, and suggests that “orthodox”40 relations between macroeconomic variables were
already effective soon after the beginning of transition. The diagnostic tests on the estimated
equations also suggest some evidence of instability, but this is limited to the first few years
after the start of transition.
                                                
40 As defined in footnote 2.
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This econometric evidence has two main implications for the current debate on monetary
policy in transition. First, since we show that a well specified mechanism of policy
transmission and of the inflation process is at work and can be kept under control by
appropriately setting the level of domestic interest rates, this provides strong support for the
feasibility of an inflation targeting (IT) strategy (and indeed for other structured strategies of
monetary policy).
Second, since we show that this mechanism has been operating for quite some time and under
different characterizations of the policy regime, we believe that this underlines the basic
continuity between IT and other strategies of monetary policy. We support the idea that IT is
best thought of as a policy framework, compatible with a range of policy strategies. In this
context, IT is designed to serve a number of politico-economic functions, signaling the stance
of the central bank vis-à-vis other actors on the macroeconomic scene and suggesting an
appropriate nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This becomes valuable especially once
the pre-announcement of a rate of crawl of the exchange rate can no longer play a central role
in the strategy for disinflation, as the latter has been almost completed. From this point of
view, IT emerges as the natural follower to a strategy of crawling band, in particular during a
process of accession to the EU and EMU.
Finally, we have also used the estimated model to simulate the continuation of disinflation in
the coming years, and to evaluate the effects of a more aggressive stance of monetary policy,
if it had been adopted in the past. Unsurprisingly, we found that in the Czech Republic, which
is the first country to complete disinflation in our sample, a more aggressive policy would
have mostly induced negative output effects. On the other hand the counterfactual evidence is
more dubious for the other countries. Overall, we do not place too much confidence in the
results of counterfactual simulations, as we cannot be sure how “deep” our estimated
parameters are, in the sense of Lucas (1976). However, we also believe that, if a more
aggressive policy stance goes together with more credibility and hence less persistence, then
plausibly its costs would be correspondingly reduced.
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APPENDIX 1: Data description and sources
Table A1 - Basic data
Label Country Period, from-to Description Source
Czech Republic 1991.1 - Consumer Price Index All items, 1995 = 1 MEI
P Hungary 1989.1 - Consumer Price Index All items, 1995 = 1 MEI
Poland 1989.1 - 1994.4
1995.1 -
Consumer prices (interpolator series)
Consumer Price Index All items, 1995 = 1
IFS
MEI
PGE Germany 1989.1 - Consumer Price Index All items, 1995 = 1 MEI
PUS United States 1989.1 - Consumer Price Index All items, 1995 = 1 MEI
Czech Republic 1991.2 - MEI
Y Hungary 1991.1 - Capacity Utilisation (Business tendency surveys), % MEI
Poland 1989.1 - MEI
Czech Republic 1991.1 - CK/$ exchange rate, quarterly average MEI
$ Hungary
1989.1 - 1990.4
1991.1 -
Forint official rate (interpolator series)
F/$ exchange rate, quarterly average
IFS
MEI
Poland 1989.1 - 1990.41991.1 -
Zloty official rate (interpolator series)
Z/$ exchange rate, quarterly average
IFS
MEI
D Germany 1989.1 - D-Mark/$ exchange rate, quarterly average MEI
Czech Republic 1991.1 - 1992.41993.1 -
Avg. interest rate, 12-mth dep., (interpolator series)
3-month PRIBOR, %
LAM
MEI
R3m Hungary 1989.1 - 1990.41991.1 -
Treasury bill rate, (interpolator series)
90 day Treasury bill yield, %
IFS
MEI
Poland 1989.1 - 1992.21992.3 -
Treasury bill rate, (interpolator series)
3 month Treasury bill rate, %
IFS
MEI
WT World 1989.1 - World Trade in manufactures (BN 1995 $) MEI
BG Czech Republic 1993.1 - Public deficit (-) or surplus (BN CK) IFS
YU Czech Republic 1993.1 - GDP at current prices(BN CK) MEI
RGE Germany 1989.1 - Call Money Rate, % p.a. MEI
RUS United States 1989.1 - 3-month Certificates of Deposit, % p.a. MEI
MEI = OECD, Main Economic Indicators; IFS = IMF, International Financial Statistics; LAM = Univ.
of Gdansk data.
Significant seasonal patterns have been removed using the Tramo/Seats procedure, see Gomez and
Maravall (1997).
To avoid shortening the sample, some missing data have been interpolated using an “interpolator”
series.
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Table A2 - The weights of the foreign variables
country periods wUS,t wGE,t
Czech Republic
before 1993, May
from 1993, May to 1997, May
after 1997, May
0.49
0.35
0.00
0.51
0.65
1.00
Hungary
before 1994, May
from 1994, June to 1999 December
after 1999, December
0.50
0.30
0.00
0.50
0.70
1.00
Poland
before 1991, May
from 1991, June to 2000, March
after 2000, March
1.00
0.45
0.00
0.00
0.55
1.00
Table A3 - Model variables
Label Definition Description
pt log(Pt) domestic price logs (1995 = 0)
∆pt 4 (pt - pt-1) domestic inflation rate
PdotGE,t PGE,t/PGE,t-1 –1 Germany inflation rate
PdotUS,t PUS,t/PUS,t-1 –1 US inflation rate
p*t log{Πj = 1, t [1 + (wGE,j PdotGE,j + wUS,j PdotUS,j)]} foreign price logs (1995 = 0)
∆p*t 4 (p*t - p*t -1) foreign inflation rate
$dott $t/$t-1 – 1 Dollar exchange rate % change
Ddott ($t/Dt)/($t-1/Dt-1) – 1 D-Mark exchange rate % change
et log{Πj = 1, t [1 + (wGE,j Ddotj + wUS,j $dotj)]} log nominal exchange rate,1995=0
et + p*t -pt log real exchange rate,1995 = 0
yt Y/100 capacity utilization ratio
it R3m/100 domestic interest rate
∆wt 4 log(WTt/WTt-1) world demand
bgt BGt/YUt government balance on GDP
i*t wGE,t RGE,t + wUS,t RUS,t foreign interest rate
Variables used in the models are in bold and italic. Variable definitions are the same for all countries
The data set used for estimation is available at: http://www.spbo.unibo.it/pais/golinelli/macro.html
APPENDIX 2: Unit roots and cointegration properties
Unit root analysis. Table A4 reports Dickey and Fuller (1979) unit root test statistics (column
ADF). The order of the test (column k) was selected by following the general (max k = 5) to
specific (“testing down”) procedure advocated by Ng and Perron (1995). Testing models are
set as indicated in the column model. Phillips and Perron (1988) test results (with West
truncation lag = 3) are reported in the column PP.
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The sample period is 1993.1-2001.1 for the Czech Republic, 1991.1 2001.1 for Hungary and
Poland. Overall, the variables examined are at most I(1).
Table A4 also reports tests for simple combinations between I(1) variables: if the unit root
null hypothesis is rejected, the corresponding I(1) variables are cointegrated. As real ex post
short-term interest rates are stationary, both foreign and domestic nominal interest rates are (1,
-1) cointegrated with inflation. On the contrary, the real exchange rate is I(1) in all countries.
Table A4 – Unit root tests
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
(a) mod ADF (b) k PP (b) ADF (b) k PP (b) ADF (b) k PP (b)
pt c, t -2.603 0 -2.572 0.592 4 -0.088 -1.909 5 -4.455**
∆pt c -3.876** 0 -3.746** -1.348 4 -1.890 -1.624 4 -2.063
p*t c, t -3.234 3 -3.160 -2.218 3 -2.902 -2.109 3 -3.016
∆p*t c -1.921 1 -3.409* -1.922 2 -3.828** -2.934* 2 -4.599**
∆pt -∆p*t c -3.987** 0 -3.869** -1.587 4 -1.744 -5.863** 3 -1.874
et c, t -3.141 1 -2.209 -0.492 3 -0.395 0.573 0 0.500
∆et c -4.937** 2 -4.726** -5.505** 0 -5.685** -2.027 1 -3.341*
et+p*t -pt c, t -2.934 3 -3.422 -1.830 3 -2.260 -2.635 4 -4.876**
∆(et+p*t -pt) c -4.367** 2 -4.459** -4.700** 2 -8.013** -6.204** 3 -4.542**
yt c -1.460 0 -1.189 -0.908 4 -0.607 -2.274 2 -1.835
∆yt c -5.709** 1 -6.768** -2.691 3 -7.277** -5.130** 0 -5.177**
∆wt c -4.499** 4 -3.136* -4.155* 3 -3.503* -4.155** 3 -3.503*
bgt c -4.800** 0 -4.826** - - - - - -
it c -1.272 0 -1.381 -2.769 3 -1.482 -2.287 5 -1.359
∆it c -5.850** 0 -5.850** -3.462* 3 -3.964** -4.933** 4 -4.458**
it -∆pt+1 c -7.476** 0 -6.732** -5.618** 3 -3.174* -3.629** 3 -6.592**
i*t c -2.045 1 -2.001 -2.136 5 -3.003* -1.495 4 -2.700
∆i*t c -3.860** 0 -3.923** -3.163* 4 -5.807** -5.482** 0 -5.446**
i*t -∆p*t+1 c -4.289** 0 -4.453** -5.036** 0 -5.030** -5.527** 0 -5.547**
(a) Data Labels are in Table A3.
(b) MacKinnon critical values for 1% and 5% rejection of the unit root null:
-3.60 and -2.93, for models with constant and without trend (c);
-4.20 and -3.52, for models with constant and trend: (c, t);
* and ** respectively indicate 5% and 1% rejection of the unit root null.
Cointegration analysis. In order to reach a long-run-balanced data representation for each
equation, integrated variables must be cointegrated. Since cointegration is invariant if we add
redundant variables to an irreducible cointegrating relation (see Davidson, 1998), we have
applied the Johansen (1995) cointegration approach to subsets of variables to save on the
number of parameters to be estimated (a very similar approach is followed by Juselius, 1992).
In the last two equations of the structural models (the UIP and the interest rate rule), the
balanced representation of the relationships among the exchange rate, interest rates and
inflation differentials requires that the real exchange rate is at most I(1), and that the real
interest rates are stationary. Results in Table A4 satisfy these conditions as a whole, while the
cointegration results in the aggregate supply and demand equations will be discussed
separately for each country.
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For the Czech Republic, the AS equation implies a balanced representation between domestic
and foreign inflation rates, and between the real interest rate and the rate of capacity
utilization. Table A4 suggests that the inflation differential ∆pt -∆p*t  is stationary. In addition,
the Johansen trace test in Table A5.1 detects rank = 2 in a VAR(4) model for the four at most
I(1) variables: (∆pt ; et+p*t -pt ; yt ; ∆p*t  ). The identification restrictions on the two long run
relationships are not rejected.
For the AD equation, Table A5.1 reports cointegration results between the only two I(1)
variables: (yt ; it ) in a VAR(5) model conditional to past values of world demand, inflation
rate, public deficit on GDP, and real exchange rate. Given the relevant number of lags
necessary to obtain white noise residuals, the long run relationship is not efficiently estimated.
The weak exogeneity of the nominal interest rate is largely not rejected; this supports the
irrelevance of capacity utilization in explaining the cyclical path of the nominal interest rate in
the interest rate rule equation.
Table A5.1 – Czech Republic. Cointegration between the I(1) variables
AS equation
Cointegration rank test between (∆pt ; et+p*t -pt ; yt ; ∆p*t  )
null eigenvalue Trace 5% c.v. 1% c.v.
None *  0.776517  92.66400  53.12  60.16
At most 1 *  0.589486  43.21614  34.91  41.07
At most 2  0.273146  13.83477  19.96  24.60
At most 3  0.095349  3.306804   9.24  12.97
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 1% level
Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating equations at 1% level
Long run relationships (s.e. in brackets):
∆p = 0.067 + ∆p*   e +p*  - p = 1.0154  -  1.326  y
       (0.018)                   (0.313)     (0.384)
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 2):
Chi-square(3) 1.979
P-value 0.577
AD equation
Cointegration rank test between (yt ; it  ) variables:
null eigenvalue Trace 5% c.v. 1% c.v.
None *  0.557283  27.20282  19.96  24.60
At most 1  0.009457  0.313581   9.24  12.97
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 1% level
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 1% level
Long run relationships (s.e. in brackets):
y = 0.827  -  0.266  i   
      (0.058)    (0.278)
LR test for it weak exogeneity restriction (rank = 1):
Chi-square(1) 0.065
P-value 0.799
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Hungary. In the AS equation, we found a cointegration relationship between the I(1) triplet
(∆pt ; ∆p*t  ; et+p*t -pt ). Results in Table A5.2 suggest that the long run inflation differential is
explained by the level of the real exchange rate (the corresponding restrictions are not
rejected).
In the AD equation, we detect rank = 2 in a VAR(5) model for (yt ; it ; ∆pt ), conditional to
past values of world demand growth and past variations of the real exchange rate. The results,
reported in Table A5.2, can also be interpreted (and identified) as a long run demand curve,
where the level of the capacity utilization depends on the level of the real interest rates. As in
the Czech case, the weak exogeneity of the interest rate is not rejected.
Table A5.2 – Hungary. Cointegration between the I(1) variables
AS equation
Cointegration rank test between (∆pt ; ∆p*t  ; et+p*t -pt) variables:
null eigenvalue Trace 5% c.v. 1% c.v.
None *  0.392819  37.53525  34.91  41.07
At most 1  0.259873  17.57812  19.96  24.60
At most 2  0.129353  5.540764   9.24  12.97
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% level
Long run relationships (s.e. in brackets):
∆p - ∆p*  =  0.125  +  1.385  (e +p* -p )
                     (0.024)     (0.303)
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):
Chi-square(1) 0.034
P-value 0.854
AD equation
Cointegration rank test between (yt ; it  ; ∆pt ) variables:
null eigenvalue Trace 5% c.v. 1% c.v.
None **  0.532740  53.40690  34.91  41.07
At most 1 *  0.355440  22.21129  19.96  24.60
At most 2  0.097469  4.204626   9.24  12.97
** (*) denotes rejections of the hypothesis at the 1% (5%) levels
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 1% level
Long run relationships (s.e. in brackets):
y = 0.682  -  0.769  (i  - ∆p)
      (0.027)    (0.511)
LR test for binding restriction (rank = 1):
Chi-square(1)  3.075
P-value  0.380
36
Poland. The specification of the AS equation implies a static long run solution, where the
inflation rate and changes in the nominal exchange rate, both I(1), are cointegrated. The
stationarity of the real exchange rate in differences (reported in Table A4) supports the
cointegration of the supply equation. This result is confirmed by the cointegration experiments
in Table A5.3, where a relationship in differences between the inflation differential and the
nominal exchange is detected, and the corresponding identification restriction is not rejected.41
As expected, in the demand equation there are two cointegrated relationships between (yt ; it ;
∆pt ), all I(1). In addition, as shown in Table A5.3, the long run relationship between capacity
utilization and the real ex post interest rate (the latter being weakly exogenous for the
estimation of the long run demand equation) is identified.
Table A5.3 – Poland. Cointegration between the I(1) variables
AS equation
Cointegration rank test between (∆pt ; ∆et ; ∆p*t  ) variables:
null eigenvalue Trace 5% c.v. 1% c.v.
None *  0.428637  36.09319  34.91  41.07
At most 1  0.185024  13.14424  19.96  24.60
At most 2  0.109520  4.755763   9.24  12.97
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% level
Long run relationships (s.e. in brackets):
∆p - ∆p*  =  0.023  +  0.622  ∆e
                     (0.047)     (0.278)
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):
Chi-square(1) 0.329
P-value 0.566
AD equation
Cointegration rank test between (yt ; it -∆pt ) variables:
null eigenvalue Trace 5% c.v. 1% c.v.
None *  0.276075  22.57671  19.96  24.60
At most 1  0.193033  9.007850   9.24  12.97
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% levels
Long run relationships (s.e. in brackets):
y = 0.729  -  0.851  (i  - ∆p)
      (0.027)    (0.315)
LR test for (it -∆pt) weak exogeneity restriction (rank = 1):
Chi-square(1) 0.518
P-value 0.472
                                                
41 Note also that (as implied by the first-order integrated real exchange rate in Table A4) the long run elasticity of
the inflation differential to the nominal exchange rate is not significantly different from unity.
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APPENDIX 3: Diagnostic tests and model performance
Tab. A6.1 – Diagnostic tests, Czech Republic
equation 1 equation 2 equation 3 equation 4
S.E. of regression 0.0408 0.0122 0.0253 0.0181
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.055 2.163 2.458 1.913
Autocorrelation, LM(1) (a) 0.4395 0.5217 0.1340 0.9973
Autocorrelation, LM(4) (a) 0.8661 0.3929 0.0300 0.8629
Heteroskedasticity (b) 0.0115 0.2024 0.0266 0.0343
ARCH(1) (c) 0.2615 0.9506 0.4282 0.4917
ARCH(4) (c) 0.1835 0.8056 0.9363 0.9977
Normality (d) 0.6562 0.6338 0.0037 0.0422
Parameter constancy, 1993 (e) 0.0061 0.7548 0.9777 0.0080
Parameter constancy, 2000 (f) 0.9920 0.6872 0.7635 0.9892
(a) P-values of the F version of Lagrange multiplier tests of residual serial correlation
(b) P-values of the F version, based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values
(c) P-values of the F version of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity tests, order in brackets
(d) P-values of the chi-square statistic based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
(e) P-values of the F version of the second Chow test from 1993.1 to 1993.4; system P_value = 0.0243
(f) P-values of the F version of the second Chow test from 2000.1 to 2001.1; system P_value = 0.9845
Fig. A1.1 – Actual (dotted lines) and fitted values, Czech R.
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Tab. A6.2 – Diagnostic tests, Hungary
equation 1 equation 2 equation 3 equation 4
S.E. of regression 0.0224 0.0137 0.0241 0.0195
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.245 1.924 1.673 1.943
Autocorrelation, LM(1) (a) 0.3260 0.8967 0.9030 0.9530
Autocorrelation, LM(4) (a) 0.1852 0.0752 0.4848 0.7301
Heteroskedasticity (b) 0.1815 0.1000 0.7265 0.4693
ARCH(1) (c) 0.6514 0.5128 0.0551 0.8961
ARCH(4) (c) 0.4008 0.0410 0.1364 0.0323
Normality (d) 0.3494 0.3003 0.0130 0.0009
Parameter constancy, 1991 (e) 0.3696 0.0024 0.0147 0.5503
Parameter constancy, 1991-92 (e) 0.3859 0.0002 0.1003 0.0370
Parameter constancy, 1999-00 (e) 0.9101 0.6205 0.9875 0.7247
Parameter constancy, 2000 (e) 0.9431 0.9374 0.8462 0.4980
(a) P-values of the F version of Lagrange multiplier tests of residual serial correlation
(b) P-values of the F version, based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values
(c) P-values of the F version of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity tests, order in brackets
(d) P-values of the chi-square statistic based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
(e) P-values of the F version of the second Chow test for all the quarters in the year(s); system
P_values: 0.0074 (1991), 0.0039 (1991-1992)
(f) P-values of the F version of the second Chow test from 1999.1 (2000.1) to 2001.1; system
P_values: 0.9581 (1999-00), 0.9646 (2000)
Fig. A1.2 – Actual (dotted lines) and fitted values, Hungary
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Tab. A6.3 – Diagnostic tests, Poland
equation 1 equation 2 equation 3 equation 4
S.E. of regression 0.0207 0.0117 0.0309 0.0143
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.695 2.393 2.391 2.013
Autocorrelation, LM(1) (a) 0.8589 0.1983 0.0780 0.9011
Autocorrelation, LM(4) (a) 0.6318 0.5742 0.2025 0.7959
Heteroskedasticity (b) 0.8066 0.8989 0.3630 0.0343
ARCH(1) (c) 0.3060 0.6531 0.2312 0.2592
ARCH(4) (c) 0.6691 0.9527 0.3678 0.4122
Normality (d) 0.0673 0.0000 0.8527 0.9754
Parameter constancy, 1991 (e) 0.4642 0.5642 0.1834 0.0757
Parameter constancy, 1991-92 (e) 0.0108 0.7566 0.2801 0.2006
Parameter constancy, 1999-00 (e) 0.7383 0.0030 0.0470 0.9728
Parameter constancy, 2000 (e) 0.9597 0.6085 0.1696 0.9142
(a) P-values of the F version of Lagrange multiplier tests of residual serial correlation
(b) P-values of the F version, based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values
(c) P-values of the F version of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity tests, order in brackets
(d) P-values of the chi-square statistic based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
(e) P-values of the F version of the second Chow test for all the quarters in the year(s); system
P_values: 0.1848 (1991), 0.0756 (1991-1992)
(f) P-values of the F version of the second Chow test from 1999.1 (2000.1) to 2001.1; system
P_values: 0.0652 (1999-00), 0.7976 (2000)
Fig. A1.2 – Actual (dotted lines) and fitted values, Poland
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